Michael Shermer: CONSPIRACY: Why the Rational Believe the Irrational

Michael Shermer’s latest book, a thorough account of why people believe conspiracy theories, why it might be beneficial (for evolutionary reasons) to give them the benefit of the doubt (even if they’re not true), with some deep dives into several real and false conspiracy theories. Ending with rules and heuristics for identifying which conspiracy theories might be true, and how to rebuild trust in truth. (( Review completed Wed 8 Mar. ))

John Hopkins, 25 October 2022, xiii+355pp, including a 35pp Coda of largely charts, and 40pp of acknowledgements, notes, and index.

This is a solid book in the usual comprehensive, methodical, Shermer way. If I’m not enthralled by it, it’s because I’ve read so much on this subject in recent years – especially since Covid – that much of its material is familiar. Many of the reasons people believe in conspiracy theories follows from the various cognitive biases and the logical fallacies in bad arguments that have been the subjects of many books over the past 20 or more years. And markers of conspiracy theories and why people believe them have been discussed in magazines and newspapers especially over the past three years, ever since the Covid pandemic began.

On the other hand, there are several points and themes here that are new to me, and I’ll summarize those upfront.

Key Points

• Shermer makes the point that enough conspiracy theories are *true* that it’s better to err on the side of seeing conspiracies (which might make you seem paranoid) rather than not seeing them at all (which might make you dead). Seeing conspiracies is a feature, not a bug. [[ This is analogous to the over-active pattern-seeking feature of human perception, that it’s better to be alarmed by a rustle in the grass, which might be a poisonous snake, than to ignore it. Even if most of the time you’re wrong. Type I and Type II errors. ]]
• Shermer distinguishes among types of conspiracy theories: proxy conspiracism; tribal conspiracism; constructive conspiracism. The key takeaway here is that many people subscribe to one conspiracy theory or another not because they “believe” the details of that theory, but because it appeals to their animus toward the target of the theory, or because everyone else in one’s tribe “believes” it, or simply because their epistemology about how the world works is “crippled,” always assuming the worst about every situation.
• I mentioned this in an earlier post, but Shermer notes that while adherents to earlier conspiracy theories (9/11, Obama) would obsess about “anomalies” in the evidence, no matter how much of the evidence supported the official story, new conspiracists don’t bother with evidence at all. They simply make assertions, or allusions to what “a lot of people are saying…” or simply declaring “rigged!” And these claims are easily spread by social media. This is a kind of pluralistic ignorance, that support for such conspiracy theories comes from signaling loyalty to a political tribe. If people really believed them, why wouldn’t they do anything about them? (Well, the guy who attacked the QAnon pizza parlor did, and revealed himself for a fool.)
• Thus people who believe in all-powerful government conspiracies, do so opening at public meetings and in books. In real autocracies, like North Korea, people could never do that.

Summary

More generally, the book runs like this.

• An overview of types of conspiracy theories by subject type: aliens; anti-Semitism; aviation; Biblical; medicine; science and technology; suspicious deaths; government; secret organizations. Lately we have election denial and QAnon. “Such theories also reduce the complexity of the world into a simple Manichean battle between forces of good and the forces of evil.” And that adherents believe they are in on a secret that the “brainwashed gullible masses” or “sheep” have missed. (p26.8) The simplicity of good vs. evil is part of their appeal; they make the world seem simple.
• Belief is widespread. In a poll about which events were controlled by the government – 9/11, JFK assassination, alien encounters, the moon landing, the North Dakota crash, and so on – responses ranged from 24% to 54%. Including the “North Dakota crash,” which the pollsters made up. Fear and distrust of others are motivating factors for belief. The Brits have their own set of popular theories.
• Conspiracy theories like these go back decades, even hundreds of years. Hitler, who blamed the Jews for WWI; The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Henry Ford. The terms were first applied concerning the JFK assassination.
• Belief in such theories crosses demographic lines. Education helps, but we’re all subject to those cognitive biases. The scientific mind is alert to Hanson’s razor, never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence or chance, 49.8. Ordinary people see patterns everywhere, and attribute agency to them.
• Details about proxy and tribal conspiracism: obviously false beliefs are true in the minds of their believers, because they *represent* more general truths for which they stand. Thus evidence does not dissuade them. Trump. Author evokes Steven Pinker’s distinction (in RATIONALITY, reviewed http://www.markrkelly.com/Blog/2021/12/12/steven-pinker-rationality-2021/ here) between the reality mindset and the mythological mindset; the latter is to bind the tribe and give it a moral purpose. Thus some people claim to believe different conspiracy theories that are contradictory. Cognitive dissonance, proportionality, teleological thinking – everything happens for a reason – all come in to play. Confirmation bias finds evidence to support any claim, as does hindsight bias, the myside bias (people who disagree with us are unreasonable, uneducated, or ignorant). Conspiracy theories are comforting; they provide a sense of control of one’s life.
• Conspiracy theories are almost always about people trying to do bad in the world. A negativity bias. Thus the idea of assuming conspiracy theories to be true, just in case. Be trigger-happy rather than gun-shy. The problem of course (as with much else about core human nature) is that these attitudes are not necessarily function in modern settings. In fact, we now know that things just happen. Entropy. No demons or gods required.
• And yet: some conspiracy theories have been true, with lists pp 100 – 103: the Yom Kippur War; Operation Barbarossa; the assassination of Julius Caesar; the assassination of Abraham Lincoln; the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that triggered WWI, and so on.
• A key chapter is Chapter 6, The Conspiracy Detection Kit, p123. Shermer calls this a “baloney-detection kit,” modeled after that of Carl Sagan’s list in The Demon-Haunted World (revew http://www.markrkelly.com/Blog/2020/01/31/carl-sagans-the-demon-haunted-world-science-as-a-candle-in-the-dark/ ). Shermer’s list:

1. How reliable is the source of the claim?
2. Does the claimant often make similar claims?
3. Have the claims been verified by another source?
4. How does the claim fit with what we know about how the world works?
5. Has anyone gone out of the way to disprove the claim, or has only confirming evidence been sought?
6. Does the preponderance of evidence converge on the claimant’s conclusion, or on a different one?
7. Is the claimant employing the accepted rules of reason and tools of research, or have these been abandoned in favor of others that lead to the desired conclusion?
8. Has the claimant provided a different explanation for the observed phenomena, or is it strictly a process of denying the existing one? (e.g. “I’m just asking questions”)
9. If the claimant has proffered a new explanation, does it account for as many phenomena as the old one does?
10. Do the claimants’ personal beliefs and biases drive the conclusions, or vice versa? (“What would it take to change your mind?”)

• The burden of proof is on the claimant; it’s not for the skeptic to disprove it. Related is the principle of ECREE, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (another Sagan dictum). So we consider proportional evidence, and Bayesian reasoning. Another set of principles for considering the plausibility of a conspiracy theory:

1. When the evidence fits other patterns, or is random, the theory is likely false.
2. If superpowerful agents would need to be involved, it’s likely false.
3. If a large number of elements would have to come together to be true, it’s more likely false.
4. The more people who would have to be involved, the less likely it’s true
5. The bigger the conspiracy, e.g. world domination, the less likely it’s true.
6. Theories about specific events and targets are more likely true than those involving larger events.
7. Assigning portentous meanings to ordinary events, the less likely it’s true.
8. The more speculations, the less likely it’s true.
9. The more claims that ‘they’ are out to get you, the less likely it’s true.
10. If a claim cannot be falsified, it’s probably false.

• Conspiracies are more difficult to pull off in open, transparent, liberal democracies. (They’re much more common in autocratic societies, where the government controls the flow of all news and information.)
• People aren’t good at understanding probabilities. Randomness is clusters of things—not even distribution of things. Thus seeing patterns isn’t evident of intent. Conspiracy theories, or secret societies, aren’t powerful; but the idea they are, is powerful. A startling insight! Shermer even quotes a John Crowley novel on this point.

I’ll summarize roughly the second half of the book in just a few more bullet points.

• Shermer goes into detail of the claims of conspiracy theories about 9/11, Obama, JFK, and the assassination that triggered WWI. It’s remarkable to read his one or two page summarizes of the official villains behind JFK and 9/11 – Lee Harvey Oswald, and Osama bin Laden —  and how they had made similar attempts before, and claimed credit for their attacks, that it seems obviously superfluous, unnecessary, to imagine that government conspiracy must have staged them. Here’s another key Shermer point: The retreat to a conspiracy theory is often driven by the scale of the event, and the incredulity that such a world-shaking event could be due to one person one or a small group of people.
• The final section, about “Talking to Conspiracists and Rebuilding Trust in Truth,” again echoes books I’ve read about how to and how not to confront people… with whom we disagree, as Shermer puts it. McRaney (here again) is a recent example. It’s not about presenting facts and figures and expecting them to change peoples’ minds. It’s about establishing emotional connections, telling stories, sympathizing with why someone would believe something you don’t. Shermer presents his own tools for confronting others on such issues.

1. Keep emotions out of the exchange.
2. Discuss ideas, don’t attack people.
3. Show respect and assume best intentions.
4. Acknowledge that you understand why someone might maintain an opinion that you don’t hold.
5. Call on someone to articulate their position in more detail. (Many people have no idea what things they’re against actually are.)
6. Try arguing the other side of an issue.
7. Practice active listening. (Pay attention to them.)
8. “Steel-man” the other person’s position, i.e. articulate their argument as well as they do.
9. Channel your inner Socrates. Items from a Boghossian/Lindsay book, p249.
10. Identify flawed or dishonest arguments. Examples of things not to do:
    1. Question motives of the other person;
    2. Question their authority;
    3. Claim membership in a group to gain authority;
    4. Change the subject;
    5. Separate people from ideas.
11. Determine how confident your conversational partner is in their beliefs.
12. Be willing to change your mind and suggest to your conversational partner that it’s also okay if they change their opinion. “When the facts change, I change my mind” 252.4
13. Try to show how changing facts does not necessarily mean changing worldviews.

Thomas Jefferson said he never considered a difference of opinion a reason to withdraw from a friend. Friendship is about mutual respect, and so on. Let other people be wrong. As McRaney said, *why* do you need to change someone’s mind? Well, in the case of conspiracy theories, it’s because believing in false ones can lead to actual harm, and the undermining of public trust.

• The last chapter, on “how to rebuild trust in truth” has another list. Has lying become acceptable in American politics? Trump lies and distorts reality, but Biden has exaggerated too. Thus a new form of journalism has emerged: fact-checking. Shermer presents of examples of lies from Obama, Bush, Clinton, Reagan, Nixon, Johnson, JFK, Eisenhower, Truman, FDR, Lincoln, Jefferson. (Of course there was a time when it was thought acceptable for the government to engage in secret plots against America’s enemies, and therefore “lie” that they existed, which wasn’t quite the same as Trump’s *claims* that things happened that didn’t, actually.)

1. Reinforce norms of truth telling and honesty.
2. Practice active open-mindedness. Note series of statements about when or if to revise beliefs. (which in turns aligns with skepticism of conspiracy theories)
3. Valorize norms of reason and rationality. Ideas from Pinker about how norms can change over time. Universities have become laughing stocks p261.
4. Avoid group polarization and echo chambers by talking to people with different opinions. How irrational beliefs are reinforced by echo chambers.
5. Develop a scout mindset. Don’t just defend your beliefs against outside threats (the soldier mindset); instead be open to new evidence and to changing one’s mind.
6. Employ a technique rebuttal strategy, rather than a topic rebuttal strategy, when dealing with conspiracists. E.g. point out cherry-picking, errors in reasoning, etc p265. [[ Gross example of cherry-picking in today’s news: Tucker Carlson’s selective edits of the video footage from the January 6th event. ]]
7. Reinforce the foundations of the constitution of knowledge, the reality-based community, and justified true belief. See the Jonathan Rauch book , lists pp 266-8; Rauch’s 10 features established a ‘constitution of knowledge’ here 267-71 [[ I have the Rauch book but haven’t read it yet. ]] There is a reality we can know. Summary of moral arc, 269.5. Whole paragraph to 270.2 QQ. Several tenets p270-1. (These summarize those plaques at the British Museum.) List of free speech principles.

Again: There is a reality we can know. We should all belong to a truth-based community.

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I’ll quote some of the passages from the final pages in the next post.