Subtitled “Why Science and Religion are Incompatible”
(Viking, May 2015, xxii + 311pp, including 46pp of acknowledgements, notes, references,and index)
(Earlier: post 1; post 2; post 3)
Summary: Chapter 4: Faith Strikes Back
Faith sometimes claims that it can deduce God via puzzles or problems science hasn’t been able to answer, the so-called “God of the gaps” argument. William Paley’s arguments about the design of the eye, for instance, and by extension “intelligent design.” But these *have* been explained by science, and the arguments for God undermined. (Nor would an such argument necessarily impugn any particular god, like the one you believe in.) Coyne reviews some of the famous arguments for God. From fine tuning: the “anthropic principle,” which has other explanations than a fine-tuning deity. (And anyway most of the cosmos, even most of the Earth, is uninhabitable; why *isn’t* the entire the entire universe a flat earth under a big dome? If that would have suited God’s purpose?) From morality: these arguments have been completely superseded by modern understanding of evolutionary psychology, referencing Wilson, Haidt, Pinker, Singer, derived from evolutionary principles and studies of human infants. And from the idea of “true beliefs,” from Alvin Plantinga, despite the fact that humans can and do believe many false things.
Other times faith argues that science is only one “way of knowing” and that religion is another. Science’s claims are accused of being “scientism,” and that religion and the humanities exist along side it. But to the extent these other areas yield knowledge, they work the same way science does, by doubt, reason, and empirical testing: “science broadly construed.” The same methods used by plumbers and electricians. Subjective experiences like art and music are more about imagination, not true knowledge; works of art yield different ‘truths’ just as different faiths do; they are culture-bound.
Faith usually just attacks science. It accuses science of thinking that it’s the only ‘way of knowing’; of thinking the humanities should be subsumed by science; that questions that can’t be answered by science aren’t worth considering; that scientists are arrogant and reluctant to admit when they are wrong. To which author responds: yes the first is true; on the second some agree (Wilson), others do not; no one says the third; and on the fourth, lots of people are arrogant. (Especially the faithful who are absolutely certain they know the cosmic truth.)
Then there are five common criticisms.
1) Science can’t prove that God doesn’t exist. Well, you can’t *prove* that leprechauns don’t exist in your garden, either. Yet you can consider weight of evidence and conclude that such claimed are extremely unlikely. If the claims about god are true, we should see some evidence. We don’t.
2) Science is based on faith. No; science works and is based on confidence base on past results.
3) Religion gave rise to science. Evidence is sketchy, but so what? Religion also has suppressed science.
4) Science does bad things. As bad as religion? There are always bad people ready to use whatever is at hand to do bad things. Recall the famous Steven Weinberg quote.
5) Science is fallible and its results are unreliable. But the point is that science is self-correcting. The occasional fraud is uncovered by other scientists. And the basic conclusions of science — such as continental drift, evolution, the speed of light — are unlikely ever to be overturned. While religion has *never* been right in its claims about the universe.
Comments
Will have comments in the final post.
Raw Notes: Ch4, Faith Strikes Back
Believers sometimes argue that religion is ‘another way of knowing’, but a more common tactic is to denigrate science.
The New Natural Theology
Robert Ingersoll, p152 (paraphrasing): “no one infers god from what is known and understood; our ignorance is god; what we know is science.”
Natural theology is the idea of perceiving god by observing nature directly, e.g. by identifying puzzles or problems science hasn’t solved and claiming that God is the answer. This is the “God of the gaps” argument. Common in 17th-19th centuries, part of the scientific toolkit of the time.
William Paley, 1802, famous arguments about the design of the eye. Recently returned as ‘intelligent design’. Criticisms of these arguments go way back, and even Francis Collins rejects them, while citing them for the universe’s fine tuning and peoples’ innate moral feelings.
List of other topics: p156m
Is this to suggest these questions can *never* have naturalistic answers? Can scientists stop working on them? History suggests otherwise.
Second, does the god hypothesis predict anything new, the way science would? If not, it’s special pleading.
Third, would these explanations have anything to do with *your* god? [[ a good point I’ve cited myself ]] Why not someone else’s god? [[ No, they’re not all the ‘same’ god. See Prothero ]]
We’ve already dismissed the supposed inevitability of human evolution. As for beginnings of life, we’ve learned a lot, and should be done in 50 years. Consciousness is difficult….
The ‘laws’ of physics are merely *observed regularities*, not laws handed down by some lawgiver. We simply wouldn’t exist without those regularities. And such regularities explain the usefulness of mathematics. P159.4 Progress on unifying theories.
The argument for God from “fine-tuning”
The ‘anthropic principle’. 69% of Americans support the argument that God must have adjusted the physical constants of the universe to permit the existence of humans. [[ occurs to me later that this presumption is only a magnitude or so away from presuming God adjusted the physical constants of the universe to permit the existence of *you*, personally. Why not? You’re very special, right? ]] Actually, only some constants of physics need to be within a narrow range: masses of particles, magnitudes of forces, etc. If they were different, we wouldn’t be here to measure them. The ‘strong anthropic principle’ claims that the values of these constants are highly improbable. First, not all constants need to be so close to their present value; second, we don’t know how widely they might vary. And other constants might give rise to other kinds of life. Why life based on matter at all? Why not immaterial beings, like souls?
There are other explanations for fine-tuning: we got lucky. Or, there is more than one universe: the multiverse, an outcome of well-established theories. (And each universe has different physical constants.)
And some observations argue against God as cosmic fine-tuner: the sheer numbers of places in the universe where life cannot exist. (p163b) There may be gazillions of planets in the universe—but most would be uninhabitable. The number of particles. Also, life on earth will end when the sun expires in 5 billion years. [[ It’s easy to imagine conditions of a universe that would satisfy the minimal requirements of God creating a race to worship him – e.g., the biblical flat earth under a domed sky. Why the enormous universe that we actually have? ]] And the rest of the universe itself is inhospitable to life, even most of the Earth. We don’t have a particularly comfortable home, p165t.
And, why did it take so long for humans to appear in a universe 10b years old? Theists make excuses that undermines the predictive power of theism. William Lane Craig just makes up stories (p166t). Scientists say “we don’t know”.
The argument for God from Morality
Darwin first suggested that morality has an evolutionary basis. A century later EO Wilson suggested the same thing p167. Evolutionary psychology. This especially bothers the theists, which maintains that God is the source of the ‘moral instinct’. [[ wonder… what *other* kind of moral instinct might exist? If our morality is not inherent in our existence as a social species… what other kind of morality might just as well exist? ]]
Moral intuitions; Jonathan Haidt. Francis Collins thinks they’re unexplainable, even defying explanation by natural selection, e.g. self-sacrifice and altruism. Damon Linker too.
But there are plenty of explanations. The premises: there do seem to be human universals, cf Pinker, p169m. Some instincts are revealed only in hypothetical situations, e.g. the trolley problem. Of course there are moral variations among societies, and changes over time. P170m. Pinker. Morality may be innate, but it’s also malleable (refuting the argument it comes from God). Much of the innateness comes from learning. “…our realization that there is no rational basis for giving ourselves moral privilege over those who belong to other groups”. P171t.
Other species exhibit moral behaviors, or sentiments—chimps have a sense of ‘fairness’ – that suggests our own behaviors did evolve. Even dogs and cats are averse to inequalities.
Other evidence comes from study of human infants, who are empathic only to familiar people, have little compassion and no altruism (which must be inculcated by parents and peers).
What about altruism? There are various definitions, but none defy explanation. For one thing, being altruistic has social benefits, enhancing one’s reputation, often with an expectation of reciprocity, especially in small groups. Another part is Peter Singer’s ‘expanding circle’ – are groups expand. p174. And we’ve understood kin selection since the 1960s.
What about true sacrifices, a soldier-on-the-grenade scenario? First, expanding circle. Second, animals will adopt litters of other animals, a hijacking of natural instincts [rather than selfless altruism]. Summary p176b. Morality is like language: we’re born with a propensity, but details depend on the culture in which we’re raised.
And if morals come from God, why do morals change? E.g. slavery, torture, disdains for women and strangers… p177t.
The argument for God from True Beliefs and Rationality
Alvin Plantinga’s argument is that our ability to hold beliefs that happen to be true can only be understood as a gift from god. This seems obviously wrong from a biologist’s pov. He argues for a ‘sense of divinity’ – though he equates this, obviously, with the Christian god and not any other god. The obvious problem with this is that we’re given to all sorts of *false* beliefs – see para p179b, and Trivers bk reference. Michael Shermer on why we believe untrue things, p180m. Plantinga explains this as having a broken ‘sense of divinity’ – because sin! (!!) – a remarkably untestable hypothesis.
Of course we can explain why some of our beliefs are rational and supported by evidence, and some are not. P181b. Humans are born with a capacity to *form* beliefs, including learning from parents and peers. Obviously accurate beliefs are necessary for some things—finding food, avoiding predators. But we’re easily fooled, as examples show. Pascal Boyer and our tendency to attribute events to conscious agents, p182m. Children in India and Indiana come to believe in very different things…
A related argument is that our brains are far more complex than anything needed in our evolutionary past. Even Alfred Russel Wallace was given to this argument for teleology. But the human brain is already complex to handle language and the social skills of living in groups. [[ the extension of this is, surely we can imagine complex skills of a brain that humans *don’t* possess… e.g. an intuitive understanding of higher mathematics. ]] And for that matter, some animals have the ability to solve problems outside their usual behavior; obviously these skills derived from skills that arose for other reasons.
Is Science the Only “Way of Knowing”?
Critics complain that science has a monopoly on finding truth, and call this attitude ‘scientism’. Francis Collins example. Spirituality and religion; the humanities, art, music, exist despite science.
Author claims that to the extent these areas do yield knowledge, they do so in the same sense that science does: by doubt, reason, and empirical testing—‘science broadly construed’. Need to define truth and knowledge; key elements are verification and consensus. These methods work, p187m, even when applied by plumbers and electricians.
Thus history and archaeology are valid ‘ways of knowing’; even disciplines such as sociology and economics.
Math and philosophy? More problematic. Perhaps they are just tools. Sean Carroll suggests that a scientific claim must involve the possibility of a world in which it is false, and it must be testable. Math and philosophy rather involve the logical consequences of a set of premises, p188-189.
Is morality objective? Author thinks not; it’s more a matter of preferences. Which can be informed by science. Obviously some morality derived from evolution, and secular reason. But disagrees with Sam Harris (in THE MORAL LANDSCAPE).
What about subjective experience, art, movies, paintings? Author describes examples of his own favorites (Fitzgerald, Joyce), considers these as examples, i.e. imagination, not true knowledge. Have any truths been revealed for the first time by literature? Author has never gotten an example p192b-193. And of course works of art often convey different, even contradictory, ‘truths’, resembling the ‘truths’ of different faiths. And art works are dependent on the culture they exist within. And what about ‘make-believe worlds that are not tied to truth about the real world’ (in quoted para p192b) [[ — this is an excellent question; what do we ‘learn’ from works of sf/f?? perhaps a central question of my bk. We learn about other possibilities. We learn about the possible world *outside our own experience*. ]]
And there are subjective claims about ways of knowing: “I know my wife loves me”. But this is an assertion of faith, and it’s easy to imagine cases where such certainly might brand one a psycho nut-case, p194b.
And then there’s religion. Proponents of the ‘ways of knowing’ argument are ultimately concerned about this. Yet religion involves authority of ancient books, faith, subjective experience, and personal revelation – nothing like the principles of ‘science broadly construed’. Religious experiences only indicate that someone has had that experience.
The Scientism Canard
Does science overstep its bounds? Examples are all pejorative. But these purported dangers are nonexistent. There are four claims:
1, Science is the only reliable ‘way of knowing’; 2, scientism means the humanities should be subsumed by science; 3, that questions that can’t be answered by science aren’t worth considering; 4, that scientists are arrogant and reluctant to admit when they are wrong.
On the charges, author says the first is true, as he’s argued. On the second, some (EO Wilson) have argued for this; others (Baggini) disagree. Anyway such charges are trivial; surely many areas could be *informed* by the discipline of scientific insights, p199m. Third – no one author has met has said this. And fourth, other people can be arrogant too. Does science have nothing to say about the beauty of a sunset? Not so fast, p200m – perhaps one day we will understand *why* some things seem beautiful and others not, why some works of art move us and others do not. [[ the former point made by me – if everything is a manifestation of god, why isn’t a manure pile, as well as a lovely sunset, a sign of god? ]]
In the end, ‘scientism’ just means ‘science you don’t like’ (Dennett). One might as well define ‘religionism’ to mean “the tendency of religion to overstep its boundaries by making unwarranted statements about the universe, or by demanding unearned authority.” With no lack of examples, p201m.
Then we have half a dozen of the most common criticisms of science by believers.
Science can’t prove that God doesn’t exist
Yes of course you can’t disprove *anything* (or prove; evidence is always provisional). But you can observe that, if god is theistic, having certain traits and interacting with the world, and, if we take proof as “evidence so strong you would bet your life savings on it”, then yes we can dismiss the idea of god. “If a thing is claimed to exist, and its existence has consequences, then the absence of those consequences is evidence against the existence of the thing.” Parallel to Carl Sagan’ idea of a fire-breathing dragon in his garage, which happens to be invisible, etc etc, so that it cannot be detected. Then why believe it to be true? There are plenty of things you prove negatives. Leprechauns in your garden? Not absolutely, but the absence of any such evidence leads to the provisional conclusion that they don’t exist.
That is: If the claims of the omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient god are true, we should see evidence. Rather, we see no miracles or miracle cures in today’s world, no confirmed effects of prayer [studies have been done], no passages in ancient scripture that show knowledge about the real world other than what was available to people alive at the time, and the observation that science has disproved many of the truth claims of scripture. P204t.
Science is based on faith
This is a matter of semantics, on casual definitions of ‘faith’. Granted, even some scientists claim this (Paul Davies).
But this obscures the obvious fact the science *works*; it doesn’t need blind adherence to some dogma. And everyone uses the conclusions in everyday life – nice para p207t.
Scientists don’t use the word. Common uses such as “I have faith the sun will rise tomorrow” are based on *experience*. Scientists have ‘faith’ in the conclusions of other scientists based on evidence, or reputation. Whereas theologians study only other theologians… and not any kind of evidence p209.
Some say scientists have ‘faith’ in physical laws. Or in the value of reason in determining truth.
Again, faith isn’t involved. These presumptions work because the *evidence* shows them to work.
Religion Gave Rise to Science
Some claim science was the product of religion. Evidence is sketchy; even so, so what? In fact some parts of science arose in other areas of the world; and there was a 1000 year gap between the rise of Christianity and the rise of modern science. And we know that Christianity certainly impeded science, condemning heretics, Bruno and Galileo. Yes, many famous scientists of past centuries were religious, but everyone was in those days. The advance of modern science is the idea of naturalism, set firmly into place only the past century.
Science Does Bad Things
As bad as religion? Not much of a defense of faith. Weapons, nuclear and chemical, are generally cited. Anyway, the charge is against ‘science’, not individual scientists, who didn’t do these things. There are always bad people who use whatever is at hand to do bad things. Might as well blame basic tool-making, since knives and hammers have been used to kill people too. It is faith itself that corrupts people, leading to bad behavior. Religions relies on moral codes supposedly reflecting God’s will; the idea of eternal reward; and the notion of absolute truth, p219b. Famous Steven Weinberg quote: “With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil—that takes religion.”
Physicists do not kill each over about their competing theories.
Science is fallible and its results are unreliable
Haven’t scientific ‘truths’ been overturned? Isn’t science sometimes wrong? Well, yes – but the point is, science is self-correcting; that’s what’s right about it. There have even been frauds in science – Piltdown Man – that are exposed *by other scientists*. And most scientific conclusions these days are intact: it’s doubtful anything will overturn continental drift, evolution, the speed of light. And none of these criticisms make religion any more credible; religion has *never* been right in its claims about the universe. P224b.
